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REPORT OF THE IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON SOVIET JAMMING OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

2 June 1950

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Statement of Problem. The problem, and the stated purpose of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on VOA Jamming, is to determine the intelligence effort which should be undertaken to assure that the Department of State is provided all possible and reasonable support in the development of technical intelligence wherewith to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America. To determine this intelligence effort, the operational and the research and development aspects of the problem must both be considered.

Background of Problem. Organized jamming of the VOA by the Soviets commenced in February 1948 and steadily increased in intensity until it reached substantially the present level in April 1949. As the result of a meeting of the Interdepartmental Consultative Group on 6 July 1949, the CIA was asked and agreed to accept responsibility for providing the coordinated intelligence support needed by State in order to determine future measures in connection with Soviet jamming. In addition, the support of the Department of Defense and the FCC was solicited by the State Department and was agreed to. A CIA report OSI-1-50 published 20 January 1950 and entitled "Historical Developments in the Jamming of the VOA by the USSR" sets forth all the intelligence on the subject known to CIA at that time.

On 31 March 1950, the IAC met, at the request of the Special Assistant, Intelligence Department of State, to consider his memorandum, dated 24 March on the subject of Soviet jamming of VOA. At this meeting, the IAC

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established an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the problem of intelligence support for the VOA on the basis of recommendations set forth in that memorandum.

Deliberations of Ad Hoc Committee. Although the problem referred to the Ad Hoc Committee by the IAC was stated primarily in terms of intelligence requirements and capacities, it was realized that review of technical and other aspects of the problem was prerequisite to consideration of the intelligence aspects. Consequently, representatives selected by the Departments for membership on the Ad Hoc Committee included those qualified in the fields of intelligence, communications, and electronic countermeasures. The CIA membership included all the activities concerned with intelligence collection and production in this field.

Three meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were held during which the Committee considered the following aspects of the problem.

1. Technical feasibility of devising methods to overcome Soviet jamming.
2. Operational usefulness to VOA of technical intelligence.
3. The need to pass available pertinent information promptly to VOA on a continuing basis. This included a discussion of special conditions to be attached to the use of such information, particularly with regard to; a. security of sources, and b. channels of dissemination.
4. Detailed consideration of each item of information needed as set forth in Tab B, Appendix I hereto, with regard to how such intelligence might be obtained through the use of monitoring facilities, covert operations or other means now available among the intelligence agencies.

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5. Allocation and use of existing monitoring facilities.
6. Exploitation of existing non-monitoring sources.
7. Extent and usefulness of additional monitoring effort.

A detailed account of these deliberations is contained in the minutes of the meetings of this Ad Hoc Committee.

Conclusions.

1. Existing scientific knowledge and techniques do not offer a solution which will enable the VOA to overcome the Soviet jamming.
2. The effectiveness of the efforts of the VOA to penetrate this jamming can be increased by knowledgeable manipulation of the transmitting facilities, increased number of stations, increased radiated power, etc. If the Soviets counter all such efforts, as now appears to be their intention, the effectiveness of penetration, though increased, would be temporary and limited in scope.
3. Technical intelligence on Soviet jamming would assist in policy considerations to determine the effort and facilities which should be allocated to the VOA and would be essential to effective operational manipulation. Currently available intelligence is not sufficient for these purposes.
4. The total information requirements as set forth by the VOA in Tab B of Appendix 1 are beyond the combined capabilities of all existing intelligence facilities of the FCC, CIA, and the Department of Defense. A small percentage of the VOA requirements could be met by these combined facilities, but only if they dropped most of their present priority commitments.
5. Answers to most of the intelligence requirements of the VOA as listed in Tab B of Appendix 1 hereto can be obtained only by covert means.

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6. Any increase beyond the present intelligence effort on behalf of the VOA can be accomplished only by:

a. A substantial readjustment of priorities with existing facilities, which would be at the expense of the intelligence activities directed at determining Soviet capabilities and intentions in the fields of Atomic Energy, Air Defense, Submarine Warfare, Order of Battle, etc; or

b. The establishment of additional monitoring facilities directed specifically at the VOA problem.

Recommendations.

1. All available information pertinent to the VOA problem should be furnished promptly to State by all IAC agencies and that OSI/CIA be designated as the collection point for such information. OSI/CIA with the assistance of the Office of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, should be charged to determine and establish such security arrangements and channels of dissemination as may be required to pass this information to the International Broadcasting Division, Department of State; these arrangements and channels to be determined in the light of materials made available.

2. A readjustment of priorities among existing intelligence tasks or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities should not be undertaken.

3. That the IAC recommend consideration by NSC of the establishment of an additional monitoring facility, provided that such consideration is undertaken in the light of the limited amount of technical intelligence for VOA which could be obtained (see Conclusions 4 and 5 above) and the

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preable utility of such a facility in any future intensification of the telecommunications war; and further provided that:

a. Such new facilities do not interfere with existing monitoring programs, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and personnel.

b. Such new facilities are thoroughly coordinated with existing monitoring activities.

Such facilities should be organized and equipped to locate the sources and determine the characteristics of radio signals emanating from within the Soviet Union and satellite states throughout the frequency bands normally used for communications.

4. That the Ad Hoc Committee be dissolved upon acceptance of this report.